INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in Sedima v. Imrex 1 made it easier for a civil plaintiff to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim by eliminating standing requirements for stating such a claim. 2 Fifteen years ago, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act Title IX Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 3 But recently, business entities not associated with organized crime have been fighting RICO battles. 4 These business entities have taken advantage of RICO's section 1964(c) civil remedy provision to garner treble damages when the business entities can show they were injured by a racket. 5 The proliferation of civil RICO claims by business entities has forced courts to seriously examine Congressional intent in enacting RICO. 6 Courts have struggled to weigh Congress' desire to make RICO broad enough that racketeers can not avoid RICO provisions 7 against Congressional intent regarding prosecutors and private individuals using RICO as a weapon against organized crime. 8 While courts have largely held that "mobster" involvement is not neces-sary for a RICO cause of action, 9 courts have employed two new prerequisites for stating a claim under civil RICO to limit the number of civil RICO plaintiffs: a prior RICO conviction and a special RICO injury. 1 0
The United States Supreme Court recently sought to clarify civil RICO in Sedima v. Imrex. 1 " The plaintiff in Sedima alleged that the defendant had cheated on a business deal causing the plaintiffs financial losses. 12 The Court of Appeals dismissed the plaintiffs complaint, due to the plaintiffs failure to allege that the defendant had been convicted of predicate RICO offenses and because the plaintiff failed to allege a special RICO injury. 13 The Supreme Court reversed in a five to four decision holding that neither a prior conviction nor a special RICO injury was necessary to state a proper civil RICO claim.' 4 After examining the facts in Sedima, this Note will discuss the Court of Appeals' prior conviction requirement and trace the development of the various special RICO injury requirements that courts have employed as prerequisites to a civil RICO claim. Next, this Note will present the Supreme Court's rationale for rejecting the two prerequisites to stating a civil RICO claim and the dissent's reasons for requiring a special RICO injury. This Note will then analyze the Court's decision and conclude that the Supreme Court correctly rejected a prior conviction as a prerequisite to stating a claim under civil RICO. This Note will conclude that while the dissent's argument for the special RICO injury is logically compelling, in the absence of clear Congressional intent to limit civil RICO claims through pleading prerequisites, the majority was correct in construing RICO broadly. Finally, this Note will propose a RICO injury requirement that takes into account the majority's concerns about construing RICO broadly and the dissent's concerns about the logical interpretation of the statute.
II. FACTS
Sedima is a Belgian corporation that imports and exports various parts manufactured in the United States and Europe.' 5 Imrex is an American corporation that exports aircraft-related parts.' 6 Sedima and Imrex contracted in 1979 to provide component parts for a NATO subcontractor in Belgium.' 7 By the agreement, the NATO subcontractor was to place orders for parts with Sedima.1 8 Sedima, in turn, was to fill its orders for the NATO subcontractor with American parts that Sedima ordered from Imrex. 1 9 Sedima and Imrex were to split the net proceeds.
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Sedima received $8.5 million worth of orders to place with Imrex. 2 ' Sedima, however, became suspicious that Imrex was padding its expense bills to deny Sedima its share of the proceeds from the agreement. 2 2 Sedima filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York 23 alleging that Imrex prepared fraudulent purchase orders and invoices and intentionally overstated the costs of purchasing and shipping parts for the joint venture.
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In addition to common law claims of unjust enrichment and breach of contract, Sedima alleged three RICO violations. 25 According to Sedima's complaint, Imrex overbilled it by at least $175,000, for which Sedima sought treble damages and attorney's fees under RICO section 1964(c).
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The District Court dismissed Sedima's RICO claims because Sedima failed to allege a RICO injury, "somehow different in kind from the direct injury resulting from the predicate acts of racketeering activity." 27 The court of appeals affirmed and added that Sedima's civil RICO claim was deficient because Sedima failed to allege that Imrex had been convicted for the alleged RICO violations. 28 The court of appeals determined that Congress intended to impose standing requirements for civil RICO plaintiffs similar to the standing requirements under the Clayton Act. The court noted that the fifth amendment to the Constitution protects persons from answering to infamous crimes without a grand jury indictment.
3 3 RICO is an infamous crime, according to the court, and therefore unconvicted RICO defendants should not have to answer to civil RICO claims.
3 4 The standard of proof for a jury in a civil case is less stringent than the standard in a criminal case and the court of appeals was concerned that civil RICO defendants would be too easily stigmatized by the 'racketeer' label without a prior conviction.
3 5 Labelling someone a racketeer causes a prejudicial taint for a civil jury, according to the court. The court of appeals wrote that the peculiar structure whereby civil RICO defendants face inherently criminal charges, suggests that "had Congress considered the problem, it would have intended criminal convictions of at least the predicate crimes as a prerequisite for civil RICO action." Courts that have applied the mobster involvement requirement for civil RICO standing have based their decisions on the title of the Act (Organized Crime Control Act) and the legislative intent that RICO should be a method for attacking organized crime. 42 Most circuits have dropped the mobster involvement requirement because courts have recognized that Congress intended RICO to be applied broadly to effectuate its remedial purposes. 4 3 Congress understood that in order to attack organized crime effectively, RICO had to be drafted in broad terms even though legitimate businesses may be accused of RICO violations. 44 Congress chose to proscribe conduct rather than organized crime status. dismissed RICO claim because plaintiffs failed to allege that defendants were involved with organized crime in land fraud action). 40 
CIVIL RICO STANDING REQUIREMENTS
Courts have eliminated the competitive injury requirement by distinguishing the purposes behind the antitrust laws and RICO. 50 While Congress designed the antitrust laws to preserve competition, it designed RICO to ruin organized crime's economic power. 5 1 Courts do not impose antitrust penalties to destroy a competitor and thereby injure competition, but eliminating a racketeering enterprise is a desirable side effect of imposing civil RICO penalties. Courts have rejected all the above standing requirements for civil RICO plaintiffs on the grounds that Congress intended RICO to be construed broadly. 6 5 Courts have been reluctant to impose standing requirements where Congress has not explicitly called for any. 66 According to some courts, it is a legislative, not a judicial responsibility to draft civil RICO standing requirements. The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that Sedima alleged sufficient facts in its complaint to make out a civil RICO claim. 68 First, the Court rejected the prior conviction requirement for standing to sue under civil RICO. 6 9 Although section 1964(c) requires an injury by "violation" of section 1962, a violation is not necessarily the same as a criminal conviction. 70 The Court noted that Congress' silence on the issue of whether a conviction is required to state a civil RICO cause of action indicated that a plaintiff need not allege a prior conviction.
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A prior conviction requirement would be against public policy, according to the Court, because civil plaintiffs would only be able to recover if the government successfully prosecuted the defendant. 72 The Court argued that the preponderance of the evidence standard for civil RICO juries should remain intact, despite the fact that a RICO conviction in a criminal proceeding would require proof be- The Court reasoned that since no court has succinctly defined the special RICO injury and Congress did not attempt to define any such injury, the Court ought not to try. 7 7 Congress intended civil RICO to be construed broadly to effectuate its remedial purposes, so the Court was not compelled to limit civil RICO standing without Congress' specific indication that it desired to limit the number of civil RICO plaintiffs by requiring a special RICO injury allegation.
VI. THE DISSENT IN SEDIMA
Justice Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion. 7 9 Justice Marshall did not address the prior conviction requirement, because he would have affirmed the court of appeals and dismissed the case for failure to allege a special RICO injury. 8 0 Justice Marshall warned against allowing RICO's treble damages provision to give plaintiffs an incentive to federalize state fraud claims. 8 Civil RICO causes of action, Justice Marshall reasoned, have become too common in suits between legitimate businesses and Congress did not intend that the civil RICO statute be used so frequently. 8 injury by a "pattern of racketeering activity," not merely injury by the predicate acts comprising that pattern. 8 3 RICO was designed to provide recovery for injuries not previously compensable, Justice Marshall wrote, and therefore plaintiffs should not be able to use RICO to recover on claims for which they can recover in state courts.
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VII. ANALYSIS
Courts have struggled with interpreting the legislative silence on the prior conviction and special RICO injury requirements for stating a civil RICO claim. 8 5 This struggle has led to divergent holdings on the standing requirements. 8 6 The majority in Sedima wrote, "Had Congress intended to impose this novel requirement, there would have been at least some mention of it in the legislative history, even if not in the statute." 8 7 The court of appeals, however, viewed the legislative silence differently and speculated on what Congress "would have" required given Congress' method of drafting civil RICO. There are three arguments that demonstrate why a civil RICO plaintiff need not show a prior conviction in order to plead a civil RICO cause of action properly. First, Congress did not intend that a civil RICO plaintiff would have to prove a prior conviction. 8 9 Second, the structure of the RICO statute implies that no prior conviction is necessary to sue under civil RICO. 90 Third, the structure of similar statutes does not suggest a prior conviction requirement. 91 The above three arguments in and of themselves do not answer the 83 Id. at 3297. 84 Id. at 3304.
The construction I describe offers a powerful remedy to the honest businessmen with whom Congress was concerned, who might have had no recourse against a 'racketeer' prior to enactment of the statute. At the same time, this construction avoids both the theoretical and practical problems outlined in Part I. Under this view, traditional state law claims are not federalized; federal remedial schemes are not inevitably displaced or superceded; and, consequently, ordinary commercial disputes are not misguidedly placed within the scope of civil RICO. concerns that separating government and civil actions cause jury standard and double jeopardy problems, but these concerns can be allayed separately.
Id.
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The best evidence of Congressional intent not to require a prior conviction for standing to sue under civil RICO is the fact that prior convictions are not included in section 1964(c). 9 3 RICO is a carefully drafted statute, the Supreme Court wrote; if Congress had meant only to provide recovery against convicted defendants Congress would have inserted "conviction" in section 1964(c). 9 4 Congress used "conviction" in other provisions, so "violation" in section 1964(c) ought not to be read as requiring a conviction. 9 5 One Congressman objected to the provisions of civil RICO because "there need not be a conviction." 9 6 This objection indicates that Congress was aware of the prior conviction issue. Thus Congress intentionally omitted the prior conviction requirement from the civil RICO statute.
RICO's statutory structure gives further evidence against a prior conviction requirement. Congress' intent to separate criminal and civil RICO provisions is evidenced by section 1963, which makes a violation of section 1962 a crime. 9 7 If Congress had wanted to include a requirement that civil RICO defendants be previously convicted, Congress would have referred to the section 1963 criminal provision in section 1964(c). 9 8 Instead, section 1964(c) refers to section 1962, which outlined "unlawful activities." 9 9
Courts have studied statutes similar to RICO to determine whether a prior conviction requirement exists. 10 0 The court of appeals found the difference between the Clayton Act and civil RICO to be instructive: The Clayton Act authorizes treble damages for injuries "by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws"' 0 ' while RICO authorizes treble damages for injuries "by reason of a violation of section 1962."102 In drafting RICO section 1964(c), the court of appeals noted that Congress hdapted the civil recovery pro- visions of the Clayton Act. 10 3 The court of appeals determined that Congress substituted "a violation" for "anything forbidden" in drafting civil RICO because Congress wanted a prior conviction requirement for standing to sue under civil RICO.
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The Supreme Court on the other hand argued that neither unlawful activities nor violations are necessarily the same as convictions.' 0 5 The majority in Sedmia defines a violation as "a failure to adhere to legal requirements." 10 6 The Supreme Court has clearly separated civil and criminal provisions in other statutes. 1 0 7 For instance, private and governmental actions in antitrust statutes are distinct. 1 0 8
Despite the above three arguments against a prior conviction requirement, the court of appeals in Sedima adopted such a requirement partially because the court of appeals feared that distinct private and governmental actions in RICO cases would lead to jury standard problems. 1 0 9 Criminal RICO defendants are convicted when the jury is convinced of their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.11 0 But in a civil case, plaintiffs can recover if they can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants were involved in racketeering activity."'I This worried the court of appeals because plaintiffs could attach the racketeering stigma to respected business entities by proving that the defendant was involved in racketeering activity by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than beyond a reasonable doubt." 12 The court of appeals found that labelling defendants racketeers in a civil proceeding is tantamount to labelling defendants criminals."1 3 Thus, the court of appeals reasoned, defendants in a civil RICO proceeding ought to be entitled to some of the protections afforded defendants in a criminal proceeding such as a reasonable doubt standard of proof for the 16 In that case, a jury acquitted the defendant of illegally harboring firearms, and the government sought forfeiture of the firearms in a subsequent civil proceeding. 1 17 The Court rejected the defendant's contention that the civil claim was barred by double jeopardy.' 1 " 8 The Court noted that a defendant is not innocent merely because a jury holds a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. 1 1 9 Thejury may hold a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding for a variety of reasons not present in a civil proceeding: improper arrest, prosecutorial impropriety, or a poor evidence gathering effort by the prosecution.
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These factors have no bearing on whether a plaintiff is entitled to remedial recovery from a defendant. 12 1 A plaintiff ought to be entitled to recover from a defendant if a plaintiff can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff was injured by the actions of the defendant. The policy reasons for allowing a plaintiff civil RICO recovery without a prior conviction are related to the reasons for separate jury standards in civil and criminal cases. If the civil RICO statute requires a conviction to make out a cause of action, the injured plaintiff would be forced to rely on government prosecutors. 123 An injured plaintiff who is required to show that a defendant has previously been convicted of RICO offenses would have no recovery if the government simply chose not to prosecute the defendant.' 24 RICO was never meant to be so limited, rather Congress intended RICO to be a means for the government as well as private plaintiffs to attack organized crime.
The majority in Sedima summarily dismissed the argument that RICO poses a doublejeopardy problem. 1 26 The argument is that by allowing plaintiffs to recover treble damages and attorney's fees from a defendant and by subjecting the defendant to criminal penalties, the RICO statute violates the Fifth Amendment provision against double jeopardy. 127 A convicted RICO violator who is subject to treble damages and attorney's fees in a subsequent civil suit may be subjected to double jeopardy if treble damages and attorney's fees are punitive in a criminal way.
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Justice Brandeis has written that "in the civil enforcement of a remedial sanction there can be no double jeopardy."' 12 9 But in later cases, the Supreme Court has set up a stricter test for what constitutes double jeopardy. 130 In United States v. Ward, 13 ' the court used a two step test to determine whether a statute violated double jeopardy.' 3 2 First, the court asked whether Congress expressly labelled the penalty as civil or criminal. 13 3 Second, if Congress sought to enact a civil penalty, was the penalty "so punitive either in purposes or effect as to negate that intention."'
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Congress intended section 1964(c) to be a civil remedy, l3 5 so a court should look to the purpose and effect of treble damages and attorneys fees in section 1964(c).' 3 6 The court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez 1 3 7 established seven factors for determining whether a statute is criminally punitive in either purpose or effect:
[1] Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
[2] whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment, retribution and deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative purpose to which it may be rationally connected is assignable for it, and
[7] whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose may have thought deserved treble damages has eluded most courts. 14 6 For this reason, the majority in Sedima rejected the special injury requirement in the wake of the legislative silence on the issue. 147 The majority in Sedima wrote that courts should not rewrite legislation to create a special RICO injury requirement. 148 Through civil RICO, Congress sought to compensate injuries caused by a pattern of racketeering activity. 149 Civil RICO recovery is available to plaintiffs who are injured by reason of a violation of RICO section 1962.150 While the majority lists indictable and chargeable offenses under section 1961,151 section 1962 is concerned with a pattern of racketeering activity. Congress, then, sought to provide a remedy for injury by the pattern described in section 1962 rather than the predicate acts described in section 1961 because section 1961 is not mentioned in the civil remedy provision of section 1964(c).
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The court in Bankers Trust v. Rhoades 53 presented a further argument in favor of a special RICO injury allegation:
If a plaintiffs injury is that caused by the predicate acts themselves, he is injured regardless of whether or not there is a pattern; hence he cannot be said to be injured by the pattern, and the pattern cannot be said to be the but for cause of the injury.
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The majority in Sedima summarized the elements of a pattern of racketeering activity 1 55 as required by section 1962, but in spite of that summary wrote, "the compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts." ' 1 56 Congress however, intended RICO to supplement, not supplant, the state laws that would ordinarily apply to fraud cases.
harm comes from the pattern of racketeering activity. 17 2 Whether a plaintiff has been injured by a pattern of racketeering activity is an appropriate question for a jury. 173 Whenever a plaintiff can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, 174 that it was injured by a group of events that a jury believes constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, that plaintiff ought to be entitled to pursue treble damages and attorneys fees under civil RICO.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court correctly rejected the prior conviction requirement for stating a civil RICO claim. Civil RICO provides a remedy for persons injured by a violation of RICO section 1962, but civil RICO does not mention the need for a conviction. Congress intended civil RICO to be a means for private plaintiffs to attack organized crime separately and distinctly from government actions against RICO offenders.
Congress provided treble damages for civil RICO plaintiffs to compensate for injuries by a pattern of racketeering activity, not to punish RICO offenders and not to compensate for garden variety frauds. Congress did not explicitly require a special RICO injury allegation for stating a claim under civil RICO, but a special RICO injury allegation makes sense because plaintiffs can recover for predicate RICO acts through state fraud claims. A jury should determine whether a plaintiff has been injured by a pattern of racketeering activity.
The Supreme Court and the courts of appeals struggled over whether Congress intended to limit civil RICO standing in any way. The Court found congressional intent unclear and construed civil RICO broadly. It is now Congress' responsibility to define any standing limitations for suing under civil RICO. 
